Elsinore Christian Center has been renting space in downtown Lake Elsinore, California for more than 12 years. But lack of nearby parking and handicapped access, in addition to the age and limited size of the buildings, led church officials to search for a new, more suitable facility in the same area, so that it could continue its chosen religious mission of serving residents of the downtown area. In April, 2000, the church entered into an agreement to buy the Elsinore Naval and Military School, the only other building in the area that would reasonably satisfy the church's needs. It is zoned C-1 ("Neighborhood Commercial District").
In October 2000, the church filed an application for a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) that would allow renovation and use of the facility for religious services. The city planning staff recommended approval, as long as the church agreed to 26 separate conditions involving such issues as seating capacity. The church agreed to them all, but on February 21, 2001, the Pnanning Commission nonetheless denied issuance of the CUP. The church filed an appeal with the City Council, which refused to overturn the Commission decision on March 13.
Elsinore Christian Center filed suit against the City on May 29, 2001. The complaint (PDF format, 112 K) charged the city with violating its First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).
On July 11, 2001, U.S. District Judge Stephen V. Wilson denied plaitiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on grounds that the church had not made a showing of irreparable harm. But he also noted that "there are serious questions going to the merits of the Church's RLUIPA claim, and the parties must research and address the meaning of 'substantial burden.'"
On June 24, 2003, Judge Wilson ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, denying plaintiff's motion, and granting defendant's motion in part, while deferring the remaining part of the defendant's motion pending additional briefing on certain constitutional issues. In his order (PDF format, 78K), Judge Wilson first found that the City had violated RLUIPA because it had burdened the free exercise of religion as defined in the statute. But then he declared the statute unconstitutional in the land use context, becoming the first federal judge to do so.
Judge Wilson wrote that "RLUIPA establishes an entirely new and different standard than that employed in prior Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence," and that "it is the Act's explicit redefinition of 'religious exercise' that effects a manifest change in the analysis." Although Justice Department attorneys had intervened to defend RLUIPA's constitutionality, and argued that the statute simply condifies Supreme Court precedent, Judge Wilson wrote that "The United States is incorrect." The Supreme Court had never applied a compelling interest standard in a "land use challenge," and thus, "Free Exercise precedent does not require the compelling interest test be applied in this context." Supreme Court precedent, he wrote, does not require strict scrutiny in cases like this one, and the City's action met the less rigorous rational basis standard.
In the end, Judge Wilson declared RLUIPA unconstitutional on grounds that "the landscape is not so pervaded by religious bigotry that this blunderbuss of a remedy can be described as 'congruent and proportional' to the perceived injury. Therefore, Section 2(a) of RLUIPA exceeds Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Plaintiffs had "not alleged an effect on commerce," and therefore Judge Wilson did "not consider either the statutory question (whether the law would apply to this case had such an effect been alleged), or the constitutional question (whether the provision is consistent with Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause)."
Judge Wilson's reasoning followed closely the arguments made by key opponents of RLUIPA, and in a footnote, he acknowledged them by name: "The Court takes judicial notice of the Brief Amicus Curiae of the National League of Cities, International Municipal Lawyers Association, The Alabama Preservation Alliance, City of Huntsville, AL, City of New Milford, CT and Village of Kings Point, NY,) as filed in C.L.U.B. v. Chicago.
On July 8, 2003, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty joined the case as co-counsel with Alliance Defense Fund attorney Robert Tyler, who has represented Elsinore Christian Center from the beginning. On the same day, two motions were filed: the first motion (PDF format, 38K) asks the court to "vacate and reconsider" its ruling regarding the constitutionality of RLUIPA; the second motion (PDF format, 18K) asks for additional time to file briefs requested by the court, to allow Becket Fund attorneys to "become properly acquainted with the facts and issues" of the case.
On July 18, The Becket Fund and co-counsel filed a detailed Response to [Judge Wilson's] Tentative Ruling (PDF format, 320K), noting that "at a minimum," the church still has standing to pursue damages. "Because the Church was denied a CUP, escrow was cancelled and the property was sold to a third party. The City has denied the Church a CUP on three occasions in both commercial and industrial zones. Such a pattern creates a reasonable expectation that the City will continue to unlawfully deny the Church in a way that makes it possible for the City to continue 'evading review.'"
The brief argues that "the City's CUP process is unconstitutional because it grants City officials unbridled discretion to restrict protected First Amendment expression. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that requiring a license to exercise a constitutional right is an unlawful prior restraint when public officials are granted unbridled discretion." The City ordinance allows Commission members to decide whether to grant a CUP based on their judgement regarding whether it is "detrimental to the general health, safety, comfort, or general welfare." An ordinance that uses "such amorphous, malleable language lacks the 'narrow, objective and definite standards' required to satisfy the First Amendment, and has been repeatedly held unconstitutional," the brief observes.
The brief also takes sharp issue with Judge Wilson's ruling that the City's zoning practices should be weighed by the Court under a rational basis test. "By allowing for individualized assessments in its zoning ordinance, the Free Exercise Clause requires the City to justify denial of a CUP under scrict scrutiny . . . This Court should reconsider and join the overwhelming weight of authority in holding that the discretionary denial of a zoning permit, as here, is not a neutral law of general applicability."
Finally, the Becket Fund brief points out that "Land use laws, like all other laws, must be 'neutral' with respect to religion. This neutrality requirement cannot be sqared with the City's laws, which disfavor churches and other religious assemblies by requiring them to obtain a CUP, but not secular assemblies such as health clubs, dance or music schools, restaurants and others."
On July 31, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a reply brief (PDF format, 101K) defending RLUIPA as a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause authority granted to Congress in the U.S Constitution.
On August 4, The Becket Fund and co-counsel filed a reply brief (PDF format, 121K) on behalf of Elsinore Christian Center, dealing with the Commerce Clause issue. This brief represents The Becket Fund's most extensive discussion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to date, citing 32 federal court cases dealing with Commerce Clause authority.
At a hearing August 11, 2003, Judge Wilson agreed to reconsider his ruling that RLUIPA is unconstitutional, allowing that it might be upheld under Congress's commerce clause authority. He allowed each side four months to conduct depositions and discoveryin the case. Becket Fund attorneys Anthony Picarello and Derek Gaubatz appeared in court on behalf of the church for the first time at the hearing, joining Robert Tyler.
On August 21, Judge Wilson issued an order finding that "Section 2(a) of RLUIPA regulates land use law and not economic conduct. This, Congress may not do." And finally, "Because Section 2(a) of RLUIPA regulates the way States regulate private parties, Congress's Commerce Clause authority is an inappropriate basis upon which to predicate its enactment."
On November 3, 2003, Elsinore Christian Center filed a request to certify the question of constitutionality of RLUIPA for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 12, the City of Lake Elsinore notified the court that it does not oppose certifying the issue for appeal.
On November 24, 2003, Judge Wilson held a hearing on whether to certify the constitutionality question for interlocutory appeal, but did not immediately rule on the request.
In a decision dated December 17, 2003, Judge Wilson granted the request for interlocutory appeal, agreeing with The Becket Fund that it meets all of the standards for allowing such an appeal:
"Certification of this question for interlocutory appeal may materially advance the termination of this litigation," Wilson wrote. "Plaintiffs note that if the Ninth Circuit were to reverse this Court, finding RLUIPA §2(a) constitutional, judgment would be entered for Plaintiffs on the RLUIPA claim because this Court already found a RLUIPA violation. . . . As a result, the case would be terminated. If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals were to uphold this Court's finding that RLUIPA is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority, this case would return to its current posture. . . But should the Court of Appeals rule in this manner, the legal analysis it undergoes will still materially advance the termination of this litigation."
On February 23, 2004 the Ninth Circuit issued an order (PDF format, 653K) signed by Judges Fernandez and Tallman granting the petitions for permission to appeal. (A separate petition for interlocutory appeal, filed joinly by Elsinore Christian Center, plantiffs, and the United States of America, intervenor-petitioner, was also filed, and was consolidated by the appeals court sua sponte with the church-only petition.)
On August 20, 2004, The Becket Fund filed a brief (PDF format, 445K) with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of Elsinore Christian Center. The brief addressed the questions of whether RLUIPA is constitutional under the Enforcement and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
Regarding the Enforcement Clause, The Becket Fund's brief noted that "RLUIPA was carefully crafted precisely to avoid the flaws of its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993." The Supreme Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores. "This difference is the result of a painstaking effort by legislators and legal scholars to comply with the requirements of Boerne – not, as the court below has suggested, to defy it or to usurp judicial authority to define constitutional violations."
As for the Commerce Clause, the brief noted that "the decision below rests on a novel proposition of law: the Commerce Clause may prohibit all manner of interference with commercial transactions, but interference in the form of state and local government regulation is immune. There is no such immunity." The brief goes on to note, "If there were, Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence could not exist, and a common form of federal legislation – laws like the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which regulate 'economic activity' by preempting local regulatory burdens that may interfere with it – would be struck down wholesale."
On February 24, 2005, The Becket Fund filed a reply brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of Elsinore Christian Center. "The City’s answering brief does little more than parrot the arguments of the anomalous decision below, which the Church’s and United States’ initial briefs have already specifically rebutted," the brief states. In bringing a facial challenge to RLUIPA, the City has a heavy burden to show that RLUIPA always violates the Enforcement and Commerce Clauses. It did not meet this burden, the brief argues. "And the City’s Establishment Clause challenge is foreclosed by controlling Ninth Circuit precedent that the City knowingly omits from its brief."
(Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, case No. CV 01-4842; Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, case No. 03-80125)
VICTORY!!!
Finally, after a bitter five-year court battle, the Elsinore Christian Center has the right to base its burgeoning church on property it owns in downtown Lake Elsinore. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a judge's ruling that RLUIPA was unconstitutional. The ruling is yet another success in the unblemished record of the Becket Fund, which has never lost a case regarding land use laws in the United States.
Late last week, the Ninth Circuit issued an order setting oral argument for 9:00am on October 17, 2005, in San Francisco in two pending RLUIPA land-use appeals, Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore and Guru Nank Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter. As the Court explained in its order,
These cases have been placed before the same panel for disposition because they each raise issues regarding the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The cases are not consolidated for oral argument.
The Becket Fund represents the plaintiffs in Elsinore and filed an amicus brief in Guru Nanak.